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ABSTRACT  
 
The Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG) is part of the Bursa 
Malaysia Listing Rules to ensure good governance in the capital market. This study 
investigates two important elements of MCCG; directors’ remuneration and the 
characteristics of remuneration committees which give recommendations on 
directors’ pay.   However, the proposal needs to be monitored by either a non-
executive or an institutional investor, or both, especially in family firms.  
 
According to the structure of a family firm, the same person is often on the board of 
directors and the remuneration committee. This thesis examines the relationship 
between remuneration and performance in family firms, represented by the 
remuneration committee and the institutional investors for 537 Bursa Malaysia listed 
firms from 2007 to 2009.  
 
This study finds evidence to support the hypothesis that directors’ remuneration has 
a significant and positive relationship with firm performance. However, this study 
did not find evidence that family firms influence the relationship between 
remuneration and performance. Also, the study finds that the presence of 
institutional investors is positively related to firm performance. However, there is no 
evidence showing that institutional investors influence the relationship between 
remuneration and performance in family firms.  
 
With regards to the remuneration committee, this study finds that family firms’ 
connections with remuneration committees has a negative relationship.  Also, the 
study finds that the relationship between remuneration committees and remuneration 
is significantly negatively affected in family firms. This shows that the relationship 
between the remuneration committee and remuneration is dependent on the family 
firms. Furthermore, there is no evidence that institutional investors effectively 
monitor remuneration committees during remuneration in family firms. Thus, this 
study suggests that the relationship between remuneration committees and the 
remuneration directors of family firms does not depend on the institutional investor 
role. 
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